Decion at Kasserine - Day 1 2nd Battle

With the air strike over it was time for the panzers to roll. Holding position just outside the Faid pass is a solitary company of American tanks on outpost duty.  A sand storm provides cover for the German advance. This meant that both sides would first observe each other at  close rang and that the Americans would not get any opportunity fire. Comparing the stats of the Germans Panzer III versus the Americans Shermans this was good news for the Germans. So as a result the battle was over two turns. Ending in the complete destruction of he Americans while the Germans lost only a single tank.

Overall a historical result, but it did take an hour. Thereby giving the Americans a chance to react. What would they do?

21st Panzer Division in Tunisia

Okay let us look at the 21st Panzer Division as at the start of the Kasserine battle


The division arrived in Tunisia as part of the withdrawal of the Afrika Korps from Libya after their defeat at the battle of El Alamein. Losses both during the battle and the retreat had reduced the division to shadow of its former self.

Fifth Panzer Army, War Diary (Extract), 24 January 1943

Upon its arrival it began the process of being rebuilt with 5th Panzer Army allocating these three battalions to the division. Panzer battalion 190 was intended to be part of the 90th Light division but had been diverted to Tunisia as part of the build up and had served as an independent battalion. It will eventually be re-badged as the II battalion of the 5th Panzer Regiment.

21st Panzer Division, Division Order for the Cap-
ture of the Faid Strongpoint, 26 January 1943

21st Panzer Division, Division Order for the Cap-
ture of the Faid Strongpoint, 26 January 1943

A brief sidebar it does eventually appear that the T2 battalion is absorbed into the 21st Panzer Division but I sa yet do not know if it ever returned to the Italian Brigade Imeriali .

After a brief respite, the division was given its first orders for an operation in Tunisia. An attack om the Faid pass. It also received some attachments from the Italian army. The above documents also show the task organization of those elements of the division involved in the battle.

The centre group is given an unidentified battalion  of the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. So soon after the allocation of two march battalions to the division is indicative that the 21st is still absorbing replacements and as yet does not know which battalions are ready for action. There are two observations that can be made from this.  The first is that there is a third group within the division made up of either non-combat ready units or those detached from the divisions control. This can be seen later on as other units appear on the divisions roster. The second is that the 1st battalion of the 104th as the only combat ready battalion of the panzer grenadiers is composed of survivors of the retreat from Libya.

Fifth Panzer Army, Operation FRUELINGSWIND, 8 February 1943

Fifth Panzer Army, Operation FRUELINGSWIND, 8 February 1943

At the conclusion of the Faid pass battle new orders are issued in preparation for the the next battle. The reference to the static elements should be read as Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer which is placed under the control of 10th Panzer Division for at least the start of the attack.

21st Panzer Division, Division order for the attack on Sidi Bou Zid, 12 February 1943

21st Panzer Division, Division order for the attack on Sidi Bou Zid, 12 February 1943

We now get orders creating two kampfgruppes for the opening stages of the Kasserine battles. These are not the only elements of the division there are others that are not assigned to the three Kampfgruppes that we know of. They are the 580th Reconnaissance battalions, 609th Flak battalion. 220th Panzer Engineer battalion and the 155th Artillery Regiment.


The war diary of the 21st Panzer provides a comprehensive history of what the division was doing the campaign. Yet there are problems that exist within it.

The first is that it makes extensive use of the various unit titles such as 5th Panzer Regiment interchangeably with the various kampfgruppe title such as Stenkoff who is the Panzer Regiments commander. If you know who commands what and when this will be no problem but it certainly can be confusing at times.

The second is that it follows pretty much all units within the division. In this case it is Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer which starts the battle detached to the 10th Panzer Division. At some stage it returns to the 21st Panzer's control as on the sixteenth it is again attached to the 10th Panzer and does not return to the division until the eighteenth of February. There is also a reference to the kampfgruppe is now composed of a grenadier battalion an armoured battalion and two light batteries.

21st Panzer Division War Diary 14-23 February 1943

Third there are many references to the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, many of these are followed by an A or B. It would appear that while there were for a while four battalions in the regiment they were operating in two separate half regiments.Of course they don't tell which battalions are assigned to each.

21st Panzer Division War Diary 14-23 February 1943

Now while there is no reference to the 104B leaving the divisions control it is recorded as returning. It is probable that it is somehow tied to Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer but there is no evidence of that.

21st Panzer Division War Diary 14-23 February 1943

Well that appears to cover the divisions changes upto the end of the Kasserine battle. I would like to say it is comprehensive and accurate but there are still a few more documents to be checked.

Hopefully there will be some covering the divisions history in the later battles.

Some referances on the Tunisian Campaign

Here is a list of some of the references being used. This list is definitely not definitive except of the limits of my knowledge and references. Nor are they presented in any particular order. It will also be updated occasionally.

Rommel' Lost Battalions by Douglas E Nash Army History No. 84 Summer 2012. A history of the various March battalions that formed the basis of musch of the Germans initial response.

CSI Battlebook 4-d  The Battle of Sidi Bou Zid. This is a student paper (albeit by a group of middle ranking officers) that comes with the following warning

CSI BATTLEBOOKS contain information compiled by CGSC student officers as a requirement of the regular course. The contents have not been edited or checked in detail for factual veracity. The views expressed in CSI BATTLEBOOKS are those of the authors and not necessarily those of CSI, CGSC. the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

So you have been warned. Some of the facts do look definitely dodgy but the analysis looks quite interesting.

Italian Army in Tunisian Theatre Found this file on an unremembered website a while ago and my google-fu has failed me in finding it again. So I cannot vouch for its provenance but I seem to recall it was good.

Some miscellaneous websites

• http://dak.webseiten.cc/
• http://www.flamesofwar.com/hobby.aspx?art_id=532
• http://homepage.ntlworld.com/bob_mackenzie/Sidi%20Bou%20Zid.htm

From the Nafizger collection are these OOBs

• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943UEAA.pdf
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GMXA.pdf
• 5th Panzer Army, 4 March 1943
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GCMB.pdf
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GCMA.pdf
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GCDA.pdf
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GAMB.pdf
• http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/943GAAF.pdf

The next links point to the various supporting materials for US Army'S staff ride on the battle.  These are almost the perfect resource containing many important documents about the battle


Background Material

• Volume 1 Part 1
• Volume 1 Part2

Lesson Learned

• http://www.history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-II-Part_1.pdf
•  Volume II Part 2
•  Volume 2 Part 3
• Volume 2 Part 4

Maps

http://www.history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Maps_Sketches.pdf

Another useful site is the sturmpanazer.com which posts a lot of orginal documents

• T78398_H1_43.pdf. A collection of various documents. So far the highlights are various organizational diagrams and feldpost numbers are 
• T78R406_H1_95_Part1.pdf. More of the above
• NARA_FMS_D174.pdf. A discusion about the commitment of 10th Panzer division to Tunisia

Decision at Kaserine

The time has come to regale you with another solo campaign. In this case it will the German offensive in Tunisia, it will be based upon the old wargamer magazine game Decision at Kasserine and will be run using Command Decision.

I have been wanting to do some Tunisian battles oh for a long time. Originally I wanted to do with Duel in the Desert the planned late desert book for the latest edition of Command Decision. But one day the armies were ready but the book was not. So what was I to do, give up hope. One day it will appear, I have faith, but in the meantime I am doing this.

So here is our battleground. in all its glory while below are the various orders of battles. There will be more to this story as the campaign unfolds

 

Fallschirmjaeger availability in the summer of 1942

After the recent impulse purchase of a Kv-II and painting it as part of Pz Abt Zbv-66 which was part of the German contribution to operation C3 the planned invasion of Malta 1942. I have developed an interest in gaming this operation out or at least exploring the possibilities in conducting this invasion.

One problem I have had is in tracking down the what German forces are actually were to be involved in the operation. Most resources mention either the 7th Flieger division or Brigade Ramcke and one suggest both. The idea behind this post is to clarify what fallschrirmjaeger resources are available in the summer of 1942 that are avilable to participate in this action and not just those expected to take part. Now Operation C3 did not take place so there is unlikely to ever be a definitive order of battle for the attackers rather there likely to be several different possible order of battles. These will reflect the development of the planning over time as well as the various debates that are occurring behind the scene.So there may exist different plans, some calling for 7th Flieger division and others using smaller forces such as Brigade Ramcke.

Now it is also generally agreed to that Hitler was at best ambivalent about this operation. This is generally assumed to be due to the losses suffered in the air assault on Crete as well as doubts about the Italians ability to carry out the operation. What this article will show is that while the Germans officially had a division of Fallschirmjaeger. it's readiness as a division to conduct an operation that was expected to be tougher than the airdrop on Crete is open to doubt. While this does not mean that the attack can't go in, it does make it easier to put off.

One thing beyond the scope of this article is the movement of individual Fallschirmhaeger as I am only tracking battalions and above. But there are several points worth noting, none of which improve the readiness of the Fallschrimjaeger. The first point worth making is that at this time the Luftwaffe was in the process of creating 20 divisions of Jaegers as part of Gorings boastful posturing to Hitler and any trained soldier such as the Fallschirmjaeger would be useful for these raw recruits as a cadre but have a negative impact on the Fallschrimjaeger readiness. Some of these Fallschrimjaeger are also being diverted South to assist the Italians in creating their own parachute units.

The largest unit of Fallschrimjaeger in the summer of 1942 was the 7th Flieger division, though it would appear that there plans to create a second division even then as several new regiments were established around this time. The division was composed of four regiments, the Sturm regiment and the 1st - 3rd Fallschirmjaeger(FJR1 - FJR3). The division had conducted no operations since Crete though all its major sub-units had been detached off to various tasks.

The Sturm regiment had four battalions was in a state of flux and would eventually be re-badged. The regimental headquarters was in Russia acting as the headquarters for a kampgruppe of Luftwaffe grenadiers under the title of Division Miendal. Of its four battalions, two the II & III were to become part of the the new FJR-5. Of the other two the IV battalion was detached to FJR-2 in order to bring it up to strength when they were sent off to Russia, the I battalion also joining them. Overall the regiment was inoperative buts its sub-units were scattered around the place and their fate is tied to those they are serving with.

Fallschirmjaeger regiment 1 had three battalions. From October 1941 the regiment less II battalion but with I battalion of the Sturm regiment replacing it had served in Russia. They all returned to base in January 1942 so by the summer should be fully operational. The II battalion had meanwhile been detached from the regiment and had become a Lehr battalion and a new battalion had replaced it. This new II battalion will most likely be operational by the summer.

Fallschirmjaeger regiment 2 also had three battalions. The I & II battalions had served in Russia with regimental headquarters and the I & IV battalions of the Sturm regiment. They had only from the Eastern front returned in the autumn. Meanwhile the III battalion was detached to form part of the new FJR-4. Soon after its return the I battalion was detached to Brigade Ramcke. Now this is speculative but I think it it reasonable to assume that the I battalion of FJR-2 attached to Ramcke includes combat ready elements from the II battalion and possibly though elements of the Sturm regiment that had served with it in Russia. So this regiment is pretty much out of action for the summer.

Fallschirmjaeger regiment 3 had four battalions but it was not operating as such. Rather it would appear that there were plans to convert the I battalion to a second Lehr battalion, though it would appear that it was not formally designated as such. Like the other two it had also spent time time Russia returning in January. Upon its return it raised the IV battalion to replace the detached I battalion. With six months back at base this was possibly the best trained and most ready unit of Fallschirmjaegeer the Germans had.

Fallschirmjaeger regiments 4 & 5 were formed during the summer. Rather than being recruited from scratch several battalions were allocated to these regiments and were allocated new ID's as a result. So III/FJR-2 formed the III battalion of Fallschirmjaeger regiment 4. While II & III battalions of the Sturm regiment become part of Fallschirmjaeger regiment 5. II/FJR-5 would be transferred to the Ramcke brigade

The final unit, I am discussing is the Ramcke brigade. It's original structure was only of three battalions each drawn from a different regiment the I/FJR-2, I/FJR-3 and II/FJR-5. As such the brigade is the equivalent a Fallschrirmjaeger regiment. This gives gives the Germans enough troops to bring the 7th Flieger division upto three full regiments each of three battalions or the flexibility to drop it as independent brigade. So within the objectives of this article, it is almost irrelevant whether the Ramcke brigade or 7th Flieger division is the unit going to make the drop on Malta. What is worth important to note is that the creation of the Ramcke brigade gives the Germans the option to drop a division sized force of three regiments onto Malta.

Yet while on paper the Germans had access to a division the actual situation is more complex. Of the six regiments and one brigade discussed here, two regiments are inoperative, two are brand new and only two are operational but they have each raised a new battalion. Thought they also have only had six months to recover and retrain after a tour in Russia. The Ramcke brigade consists of three veteran battalions, one of which has recently returned from Russia. So of the nine battalions that comprise the three regiments and brigades of the 7th Flieger division force to attack Malta. Six are older battalions hopefully fit, rejuvenated and ready for operation, two are new and one older battalion recently back from Russia. To push this reasoning to its extreme conclusion only six battalions may be fully 100% ready for an airborne assault. Though doubts maybe raised about even this number as I suggested earlier if you consider the movement of individuals.

I have also been vague on dates referring only to the summer of 1942. This has been deliberate on my part as in most part the data just does no exist. Even when it has, I have chosen to refer only to the season inpart because everything is not set in stone and could change at anytime from the end of the Gazala battles to when the Folgore division is sent to North Africa. As everything could still change, much of what I have outlined here is only relatively true. With availability being even lower at the start of summer and higher at the end.

So in conclusion. If Operation C3/Herkules is dependent upon having a division of German Fallschrimjaeger there does exist grounds for delaying the mission. Time is required to get the division fully operational or acceptance of a higher risk of failure or greater losses. A smaller force requirement is a far to get into the field.

Now for a note on sources.

Tessin's, Deutsche Verbände und Truppen 1918–1939 got me started on this.

Bruce Quarries, German Airborne Divisions: Mediterranean Theatre 1942-45 was useful in tracking the movement of the various units.

Then of course there is the web.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de

http://www.ww2.dk/

http://www.feldgrau.net